Evolution of Co-operation When the Strategies are Hidden: The Human Mating Game by Milind Watve et al.
Evolution of Co-operation When the Strategies are 
Hidden: The Human Mating Game
Anuja Damle 1,3 
Bratati Ganguli 1,4
Anagha Kale 1,2
Milind Watve 1,2,3*
1Department of Microbiology, M.E.S. Abasaheb Garware College, Karve Road, Pune  
Maharashtra 411004, India. Tel: 91-20-25440311
 
2Life Research Foundation, 10, Pranav, 1000/6-c Navi Peth, Pune, Maharashtra 411  
030, India. Telefax: 91-20-24338009
3Anujeeva Biosciences Pvt. Ltd., Pune India
4Department of Chemistry and Molecular Biology, North Dakota State University, 1231  
Albrecht avenue, PO Box-5516, Fargo, ND 58105-5516. USA. Tel: 7012318483  
*Correspondence and requests for materials should be addressed to:
milind_watve@yahoo.com
N
at
ur
e 
Pr
ec
ed
in
gs
 : 
do
i:1
0.
10
38
/n
pr
e.
20
07
.7
40
.1
 : 
Po
st
ed
 1
6 
Au
g 
20
07
                    Defection is frequently seen in co-operative systems [1-3]. Game 
theoretical solutions to stabilize cooperation rely on reciprocity and reputation in 
iterated games[4-5]. One of the basic requirements for reciprocity or reputation 
building is that the strategies of players and the resulting payoffs should be open 
at the end of every interaction.  For games in which the strategies and payoffs 
remain hidden, these stabilizing factors  are  unlikely to work.  We examine the 
evolution of cooperation for hidden-strategy games using human mating game as 
an example.  Here faithful parenting can be considered as cooperation and extra-
pair mating (EPM) or cuckoldry as defection. Cuckoldry may get exposed only 
occasionally and the genetic benefits of cuckoldry also remain hidden from the 
players.  Along  with  mate  guarding,  social  policing  is  enabled  in  humans  by 
language and gossiping. However, social policing can be invaded by second order 
free riders. We suggest that opportunistic blackmailing, which is unique to hidden 
strategy games can act as a keystone strategy in stabilizing co-operation. This can 
counteract free riding and stabilize policing. A game theoretical model results into 
a rock - paper – scissor (R-P-S) like situation with no evolutionary stable strategy 
(ESS).  Simulations  result  into  a  stable  or  stably  oscillating  polymorphism. 
Obligate monogamy is an essential trait in the co-existence. In a gender difference 
model  too,  polymorphism  is  seen  in  both  genders  but  with  different  traits 
predominating in the two genders. The model explains intra-gender, inter-gender 
as well as cross cultural variability in mating strategies in humans.
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Introduction
Cooperation is commonly accompanied by cheating or defection in a number of 
naturally occurring social systems [1-3]. The problem of evolution and stability of 
cooperation  between  individuals  is  commonly  addressed  using  a  game  theory 
model  popularly  known as  Prisoner’s  Dilemma (PD).  In  a  one  time PD game, 
cooperation is not stable and defection is the only stable strategy for any player [4]. 
However,  in  iterated  games  strategies  involving  reciprocity  or  reputation  can 
stabilize cooperation [4-5]. If the same individuals play the game again, defection 
can be retaliated [4]. Co-operators can build a reputation and derive long term gains 
from  it  [5].  Recent  empirical  [6]  and  theoretical  [7,  8]  studies  emphasize  that 
cooperation  can  evolve  if  co-operators  punish  those  who  defect.  A  potential 
problem in punishment is that there is a cost in executing punishment, which makes 
punishment an altruistic act. Since the benefits of punishing cheaters are shared, 
there  arises  a  possibility  of  second  order  free  riders  that  do  not  contribute  to 
punishment  but  gain  from  it.  The  second  order  free  riders  can  destabilize 
punishment  and  cooperation  in  turn.  A number  of  conditional  solutions  to  this 
problem  have  been  suggested  [7-9].  One  of  the  basic  assumptions  behind  all 
suggested solutions to the problem of stability of cooperation is that the strategies 
of players and the resulting payoffs are open at  the end of every interaction.  If 
players  know  the  history  of  an  individual  player  retaliation  or  punishment  is 
possible.  Public  knowledge  can  help  build  reputation,  which  further  enhances 
cooperation. Reciprocity and reputation would fail to work for games in which the 
strategies and payoffs remain hidden. If the players have a choice of secrecy or 
deception  the  outcome  would  be  much  different.  We  model  the  evolution  of 
cooperation when the strategies and payoffs remain hidden most of the time. 
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The human mating  system is  an  ideal  and  obvious  example  of  hidden strategy 
games.  In  species  where  biparental  care  is  necessary,  faithful  parenting  can  be 
considered as cooperation and extra-pair  mating (EPM) or cuckoldry [10-17] as 
defection. Here, the polygamous or defecting individuals get an additional genetic 
advantage, but their  mates have to bear a genetic loss. The nature of advantage 
obtained by males and females is qualitatively different. Males can increase their 
reproductive success quantitatively by gaining access to more females. Females, on 
the other hand, may not increase the number of offspring but may gain qualitatively 
through sperm competition or getting dual benefit of good parenting from one male 
and good genes from another [11, 18-22]. Cuckoldry is a hidden strategy and its 
genetic payoffs also remain hidden since players do not have a direct  access to 
paternity information.
                 Two types of measures against cuckoldry are seen in the human society, 
namely mate guarding [17], a trait shared by many species [23-26] and punishment 
if  cuckoldry  gets  exposed  [27],  a  trait  predominantly  human.  Although  the 
probability of getting exposed is small its consequences are known to be severe in 
most  human  societies  and  exposed  adulterous  individuals  generally  receive 
punishment in some or the other form. Altruistic punishment or strong reciprocity 
has  been  used  in  the  models  of  evolution  of  cooperation  [5-7,  28].  However, 
altruistic punishment suffers from the problem of second order free riders [29]. In 
the human mating system there can be a non-altruistic punishment in the form of 
social sanctions. If an adulterous individual is deserted by its partner and makes the 
reason public, the probability of pairing again could be very small for the deserted 
individual owing to social sanctions. For the deserting partner,  if the probability 
and benefit of pairing again is higher than continuing partnership with a defector, 
deserting  would  be  a  non-altruistic  way of  punishing.  Avoiding  pairing  with  a 
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known defector is also a non-altruistic act. Therefore, punishment for cuckoldry in 
the form of social  sanctions can be probabilistic but need not have an altruistic 
element in it.
In humans, due to evolution of language, gossip is possible through which one can 
gain information about the behaviour of a sexual partner in one’s absence. This is 
an indirectly reciprocating, apparently altruistic social act that we will call ‘social 
policing’.  The  cost  involved  in  social  policing  can  be  substantially  small  as 
compared to individual mate guarding. However, as long as there is a cost of social 
policing  some  second  order  free  riders  can  take  advantage  of  the  system. 
Individuals  who  do  not  contribute  to  social  policing  may still  gain  from it  by 
getting  information  about  their  sexual  partner.  Such  free  riders  can  destabilize 
social policing. We suggest here that opportunistic blackmailing can give a solution 
to  the  problem.  Since  the  strategies  are  hidden  and  exposure  can  lead  to 
punishment, blackmailing is possible. When defection is exposed to only one or a 
few  individuals  the  defector  may  give  some  form  of  direct  benefits  to  the 
blackmailer and avoid social punishment. Since blackmailing necessarily depends 
upon differential secrecy, it is restricted to hidden strategy games. The success of 
blackmailing  is  highly  conditional,  but  whenever  the  conditions  favour 
blackmailing, it can give direct returns on investment in policing. Policing without 
blackmailing is  an altruistic  act  and will  be selected against  in  the presence  of 
blackmailers. For a policing individual, the opportunities to blackmail increase with 
increasing  investment  in social  policing.  Since non-policing individuals  are  less 
likely  to  get  a  blackmailing  opportunity,  free  riders  are  unlikely  to  thrive.  All 
individuals engaged in EPM, on the other hand, have to bear a probabilistic penalty 
as a result of social sanctions or blackmailing. 
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Our model assumes a “marriage system” in which every individual player 
has to engage in a cooperative parenting act. In other words,  all individuals are 
socially monogamous, but they can become genetically polygamous by engaging in 
EPM. Players have a choice to desert and probabilistically pair again with a random 
individual. Players are  also allowed to deny pairing with individuals with a bad 
reputation. Individual players in the model can have alternative strategies on four 
different  lines.  Individuals  can  be  (i)  genetically  monogamous  (M+)  i.e.  co-
operators, or polygamous (M-) i.e. defectors (ii) guarding (G+) or non-guarding (G-) 
(iii) policing (P+) or non-policing (P-) and (iv) blackmailers or non-blackmailers. 
Combinations of the above traits  give 16 different strategies.  However,  policing 
without  blackmailing  is  at  an  all  time  disadvantage  as  compared  to  policing 
blackmailers. On the other hand since the information necessary for blackmailing is 
acquired by policing, non-policing blackmailers cannot exist. This results into an 
obligate association between policing and blackmailing and leaves only 8 strategies 
in the game.  
Results: 
The payoff matrix (Table 1) shows that if the maximum probabilistic 
cost  of punishment is greater  than the advantage of polygamy, there  is no  ESS 
possible.  This  leads  to  a  R-P-S  like  situation  [Fig  1].  A  monogamous,  non-
guarding, non-policing (M+G-P-) strategy can be invaded by any of the polygamous 
(M-) traits. Once a substantial proportion of the population is polygamous, guarding 
(G+) and policing (P+) become advantageous strategies. However, when majority of 
the population is M-G+P+ the burden of punishment and blackmailing reaches its 
maximum. Therefore an M+G+P+ trait can invade the population. With majority of 
individuals being monogamous, guarding and policing lose their relevance and the 
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M+G-P- trait invades the population since it does not pay these costs. This RPS like 
situation  gives  rise  to  a  stable  or  oscillating  polymorphism  with  obligate 
monogamy as an essential trait. 
Simulations showed however, that the dynamics was more complex [Fig. 2 and 3]. 
For example, although  M-G+P+ was the fittest among the polygamous traits when 
the  entire  population  was  polygamous,  when  the  population  had  a  certain 
proportion of monogamous individuals,  M-G-P+ or  M-G+P- enjoyed greater fitness 
then M-G+P+.  As a result of differential fitness advantages at different population 
composition, all the eight strategies could coexist in stable oscillations [Fig 2]. At 
high rates of punishment, oscillations dampened rapidly to give stable steady states 
with co-existence of all 4 policing traits [Fig 3a]. Stable or oscillating co-existence 
critically depended upon blackmailing. If the blackmailing benefit was reduced to 
zero, only polygamy with mate guarding prevailed [Fig 3b]. Stable steady states 
were obtained when the punishment was greater than a threshold [Fig 4]. 
The simulations were run with two sets of assumptions. In the first, 
no  gender  difference  was  assumed  and  therefore  the  model  was  equivalent  to 
assuming that any individual randomly mated with any other. In the second, two 
genders  were  assumed  and  there  was  random  pairing  between  individuals  of 
opposite genders. Results of the two-gender model were identical to the non-gender 
model if parameters for both the genders were kept identical. 
With different parameters for the two genders, we obtained differential outcome for 
males and females. For males, the genetic advantages of EPM as well as the genetic 
loss from partner’s EPM can be greater as compared to females. In many societies, 
the punishment for cuckoldry is more severe for females. It is also likely that males 
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can get  a  higher  benefit  from blackmailing.  The former  differences  are  genetic 
whereas  the  later  two  are  decided  more  by  social  norms.  Introducing  these 
differences  in  the  model  resulted  into different  proportions  of  traits  in  the  two 
genders; nevertheless, polymorphism existed in both the genders (Fig. 5a and b). 
Discussion:
All models for the evolution and stability of cooperation in a PD like game are 
dependent upon knowledge and memory of an individual’s strategies in some way 
or the other. In reality there can be many situations where the players can hide their 
strategies. None of the known mechanisms for the stability of cooperation are likely 
to work under these conditions. It would appear therefore that cooperation couldn’t 
be stable when the strategies are hidden. We show on the contrary that even if there 
is a small probability of exposure of the strategies, policing and cooperation can be 
stable. This depends critically on blackmailing that gives stability to policing. In 
open strategy games, on the other hand, blackmailing is not relevant and therefore 
the problem of free riders persists. Thus ironically, cooperation is more likely to be 
stable when the strategies are hidden.
Although our model is in the specific context of human mating system, it has more 
general  implications.  The  necessary  conditions  for  a  general  application  of  the 
model are that a non-altruistic punishment exists and blackmailing is possible. In 
all the previous models involving punishment, punishing is more effective when the 
frequency of defectors is low and that of punishers is high [5, 9]. As a result it is 
difficult  for  co-operators  and  punishers  to  invade  defectors.  In  our  model  the 
opportunities of blackmailing increase with increasing frequency of defectors. This 
strengthens  the  invading power  of  policing traits  and the model  becomes more 
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independent  of  the  initial  conditions.  The  benefits  of  policing  decrease  when 
majority  of  the  population  consists  of  co-operators.  Such  a  negative  frequency 
dependence, which is unique to this model as compared to all PD based cooperation 
models, makes co-existence of different strategies possible. 
The model has important implications for the stability of monogamy and 
biparental  care.  The model  shows that  although mate guarding  can counteract 
cuckoldry to some extent, it cannot stabilize monogamy. In the absence of social 
sanctions and blackmailing, opportunistic promiscuity with mate guarding is the 
only ESS. The model theoretically demonstrates for the first time that Darwinian 
mechanisms can make obligate monogamy stable in a population. Although there 
are advantages of occult promiscuity to both, males and females, the punishment 
and blackmailing cost is frequency dependent. Therefore a significant proportion 
of  the  population  can  remain  obligately  monogamous.  Kale  and  Watve  [27] 
showed similar stability earlier but their model involved altruistic punishment and 
results  critically  depended upon an unsubstantiated assumption that  only mate 
guarding  individuals  contribute  to  social  punishment.  The blackmailing model 
makes altruism and any such assumptions unnecessary. 
A  popular  critic  of  evolutionary  psychology  has  been  that  it  predicts 
gender  specific  stereotypes,  whereas  there  are  data  for  much  intra-gender 
variation in human societies [16, 28]. Intra-gender variation has received much 
less theoretical attention than sex differences have [30]. Surprisingly the role of 
punishment  and  social  policing  is  rarely  appreciated  [31,  32].   A  good 
evolutionary model for human sex should be one that explains the universals as 
well  as  intra-gender,  inter-gender  and  cross  cultural  differences  [28,  30-33]. 
Classical  sexual  selection  models  are  unable  to  do  so  and  the  theory  of 
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cooperative games is emerging as a promising alternative [34]. Unlike classical 
sexual selection models, in our model different strategies can coexist in the same 
gender  and  the  predominant  traits  can  be  different  in  males  and  females. 
Furthermore some of the parameters are culture dependent and these factors can 
affect the resulting proportions of traits.  Thus the model accommodates cross-
cultural differences as well. The classical sexual selection theory holds that all 
individuals should be opportunistic defectors and if we see faithful monogamy in 
the population it  must be owing to the lack of opportunities for EPM. On the 
contrary our model predicts that some proportion of both the genders will not 
engage in EPM by choice. This is perhaps the first evolutionary model that shows 
stability of obligate monogamy in spite of the genetic advantages of EPM.
Further,  although the model does not incorporate behavioural flexibility 
and  conditional  strategies,  it  is  compatible  with  these  concepts.  Conditional 
strategic  pluralism [16]  can  certainly  add to  the  intra-gender  differences.  The 
observed  intra-gender  variation  could  be  genetic,  conditional  or  cultural  and 
currently it is difficult to distinguish between the sources of variation. What our 
model necessarily  demonstrates is that the presence of intra-gender  and cross-
cultural differences cannot be taken as evidence against the role of genetic and 
Darwinian forces in shaping human behaviour.
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Methods:
 The  model:  The  underlying  game can  be  called a  “marriage  game”  in  which 
individuals pair for life but have a choice to desert the partner and pair again. The 
eight possible strategies considered for the model were 
M +G –P- M -G –P-
M +G +P- M -G +P-
M +G –P+ M -G –P+
M +G +P+ M -G +P+
Where M = obligate monogamy, G = individual mate guarding and P = policing 
and opportunistic blackmailing. 
We assumed that the fitness of a strictly monogamous pair was 1. This 
was taken as the baseline fitness for the model. All polygamous individuals had 
an additional advantage Z as a result of extra pair mating whereas their partners 
had to bear  a genetic loss  L.  L could consist  of several  components including 
direct genetic loss due to cuckoldry, loss in parenting resources coming from the 
partner  as well as the probability of being deserted and inability to pair again. 
Individuals actively guarding their mates incurred a cost of guarding gc, and as a 
result of guarding could reduce their loss  L by a fraction  S. For guarding to be 
effective  it  was  necessary  to  assume  L.S >  gc.  We assumed that  the  cost  of 
policing pc < gc since policing was a cooperative act. The benefit of cooperative 
mate guarding  α,  was availed by all individuals alike and was assumed to be 
directly proportional to the fraction of policing individuals (P+) in the society. 
Thus the loss  L was reduced by a fraction  α.P+. Reciprocally, for polygamous 
individuals  their  benefit  Z was  reduced by a  fraction  S when the partner  was 
guarding. As a result of social policing, there was a reduction β in the success of 
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cuckoldry  that was directly proportional to P+. Policing had dual function, as on 
the one hand it prevented EPM; on the other it exposed adultery. The exposed 
individuals were assumed to get punishment BB the probability of which was in 
direct proportion to the fraction of policing individuals in the society. The term 
BB was  taken  to  include  the  probability  of  being  exposed  and  receiving 
punishment, the direct loss in reproduction owing to deserting by the partner, a 
bad reputation resulting into reduced probability of pairing again or alternatively 
the probability of being blackmailed. For a policing individual the opportunities 
to  blackmail  were  assumed  to  increase  with  the  number  of  polygamous 
individuals in the population. Hence, blackmailing could give direct returns to the 
policing individuals proportional to the fraction of all polygamous individuals, the 
proportionality constant being  BP. We kept  BP < BB  throughout the model. A 
payoff matrix (table 1) was constructed based on these assumptions.
When Z(1-β-S) > BB, M-G+P+ was the only possible ESS. However if Z(1-
β-S) < BB, there was no ESS in the model. Under these conditions a rock-paper-
scissor  like situation allowed stable or  stably oscillating polymorphism.  If  the 
population began with M+G–P- as the dominant trait, it could be invaded by any of 
the polygamous traits owing to the advantage of polygamy, the strongest among 
the invaders being M-G–P-  since it did not pay the cost of guarding and policing. 
Once  polygamy  was  predominant,  guarding  and  policing  became  beneficial 
strategies.  Therefore M-G–P-  could be invaded by other  polygamous traits  with 
guarding and/or policing, the strongest invader being M-G+P+. A population of M-
G+P+ paid a heavy penalty since the probability of punishment and blackmailing 
was at its maximum. Therefore it could be invaded by M+G+P+ if Z(1-β-S) < BB. 
This was because a monogamous invader did not encounter punishment and/or 
blackmailing. Invasion by M+G-P+ was also possible if L.S + Z(1-β-S) < BB+gc. 
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However  this  invasion  was  always  weaker  than  that  by  M-G+P+  due  to  the 
difference in the advantage of blackmailing. Once majority of the population was 
monogamous, the costs of guarding and policing become unnecessary and M+G-P- 
invaded M+G+P+. This completed a rock-paper-scissor like cycle in which at least 
four players could invade each other cyclically. 
Numerical simulations were run for 5000 generations to study the evolutionary 
dynamics  of  all  the  8  strategies  together.  As  a  result  of  differential  fitness 
advantages at  different  population composition, all  the eight strategies showed 
stable oscillations when the condition  Z(1-β-S) < BB was satisfied. Oscillations 
dampened rapidly to give stable steady states with co-existence of typically 4 
traits.  The  most  critical  parameter  for  stable  or  oscillating  co-existence  and 
survival of monogamy in particular was blackmailing. The condition Bp>pc was 
absolutely essential for survival of policing and thereby survival of monogamy. If 
blackmailing was removed from the model, monogamy did not survive under any 
set of conditions. 
Stable equilibrium in the mono and polygamous traits was possible when 
BB was sufficiently large. With increasing fitness advantage L (as well as loss Z) 
due to polygamy, a larger  BB was required for stability. The line dividing the 
oscillation and stable steady state areas in figure 4 showed a sudden shift at LS/gc  
=  Bp/pc.  This  was  because  when  LS/gc was  smaller,  guarding  traits  did  not 
survive  in  the  population.  Therefore  a  larger  BB was  needed  to  stabilize 
polymorphism. When LS/gc > Bp/pc, guarding traits replaced non-guarding ones 
and a lower BB was sufficient. 
The simulations were run with two sets of assumptions. In the first,  no 
gender  difference  was  assumed  and  therefore  the  model  was  equivalent  to 
assuming that any individual randomly mated with any other. In the second, two 
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genders  were  assumed  and  there  was  random  pairing  between  individuals  of 
opposite  genders. Results  of  the  two-gender  model  were  identical  to  the  non-
gender model if parameters for both the genders were kept identical. Assuming 
different  cost  benefits  of  EPM for  the  two  genders,  we  obtained  differential 
outcome for  males  and females.  (The fitness  values  were  relative  and gender 
specific. So that it  was not necessary for the model that the average fitness of 
males and females matched.) Introducing these differences in the model resulted 
into different proportions of traits in the two genders; nevertheless, polymorphism 
existed in both the genders. Interestingly satisfying the condition Z(1-β-S) < BB 
in  only  one  of  the  genders  was sufficient  for  polymorphism in both  genders. 
Difference  in  L,  Z or  BB alone  or  in  combination  led  to  substantial  gender 
difference.  If  males had greater  L and  Z and/or  smaller  BB,  there was greater 
proportion of polygamy in males as compared to females. A difference in Bp, on 
the other hand was unable to induce substantial difference in the proportion of 
traits across genders. 
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Figure legend:
Figure 1 | Rock-Paper-Scissor (R-P-S) like situation. 
The pay off matrix shows that there is no particular ESS. Players invade each 
other cyclically in a complex interplay as indicated by the arrows.  
Figure 2 | Oscillating co-existence of all the 8 traits owing to a complex rock-
paper-scissor like situation. 
Parameters in these simulations were: Loss in genetic advantage due to
EPM L = Z = 0.2, benefit of social policing availed by all α = β = 0.2, t h e  cost 
of policing pc = 0.01, cost of mate guarding gc = 0.02, punishment BB = 0.1, S = 
0.4 and the probabilistic benefit to the blackmailer BP =0.1.
Colour key:
M+G-P-                    M+G+P-                      M+G-P+                  M+G+P+
M-G-P-            M-G+P-                M-G-P+        M-G+P+
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Fig 3 | Damped oscillations giving co-existence of typically 4 traits.      
a) Stability was achieved at large  BB and small  L. The assumption  Bp>pc was 
most critical for stable polymorphism. 
Parameters:
 L = Z= 0.8, α = β = 0.2, pc = 0.0, gc = 0.025, BB = 0.75, S = 0.6, BP = 0.1
b) Making Bp = 0 (all other parameters as in a) resulted into dominance of a 
single polygamous and mate guarding trait.
For colour key to figures refer to figure 1. 
Fig 4 | Parameter areas for stable and oscillating polymorphism.  
Only a single polygamous trait survives at very small values of BB. At moderate 
BB there  is  oscillating coexistence of polygamous and monogamous traits.  At 
higher BB there is stable polymorphism. A sudden shift is seen at LS/gc = Bp/pc, 
above which mate guarding traits survive and BB needed for stability is smaller. 
This  is  because  when  L.S/gc is  smaller,  guarding  traits  do  not  survive  in 
population.  Therefore  a larger  BB is  needed to stabilize polymorphism.  When 
L.S/gc > BP/ pc, guarding traits replace the non-guarding ones and a lower BB is 
sufficient.  The demarcating  boundaries  are  linear  when only guarding  or  only 
non-guarding traits are assumed to be present in the simulations. 
19
N
at
ur
e 
Pr
ec
ed
in
gs
 : 
do
i:1
0.
10
38
/n
pr
e.
20
07
.7
40
.1
 : 
Po
st
ed
 1
6 
Au
g 
20
07
Legend for boundary colours demarcating areas of stable steady state and 
oscillating co-existence: 
        When both guarding and non-guarding traits are present
        When only guarding traits are present 
        When only non-guarding traits are present 
        Demarcates the area of polymorphism. Polygamy with or without guarding is an 
ESS below this line.  
Other parameters being L = Z, α = β = 0.2, pc = 0.01, gc = 0.02, S = 0.6, BP = 
0.1
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 Fig 5 - Typical results of the gender difference model.
When parameters were different for the two genders, polymorphism resulted in 
both genders but the predominant traits were different. Interestingly satisfying the 
condition  Z.(1-β-S)  <  BB in  only  one  of  the  genders  was  sufficient  for 
polymorphism in  both  genders.  Increased  model  complexity  frequently  led  to 
complex  waves  or  chaos,  nevertheless  a  few  traits  remained  consistently 
dominant in each gender.
a) Female traits
 L = Z = 0.15, α = β = 0.3,  pc = 0.01, gc = 0.018, BB = 0.1, S = 0.4, BP = 0.1
b) Male traits
L = Z = 0.2, α = β = 0.3, pc = 0.01, gc = 0.018, BB = 0.09, S = 0.4, BP = 0.1
For colour key to figures refer to figure 1. 
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Table 1: The payoff matrix
     Population
Invader
M+G –P- M +G +P- M+G-P+ M +G +P+ M -G –P- M -G +P- M -G –P+ M -G +P+
M +G –P- 1 1 1 1 1-L 1-(L(1-α)) 1-L 1-(L(1-α))
M +G +P- 1-pc 1-pc 1-pc 1-pc 1-L-
pc+BP
1-(L(1-
α))-pc+BP
1-L-pc+BP 1-(L(1-α))-
pc+BP
M +G –P+ 1-gc 1-gc 1-gc 1-gc 1-(L(1-
S))-gc
1-(L(1-α−
S))-gc
1-(L(1-S))-
gc
1-(L(1-α−
S))-gc
M +G +P+ 1-gc-pc 1-gc-pc 1-gc-pc 1-gc-pc 1-(L(1-
S))-gc-
pc+BP
1-(L(1-α−
S))-gc-
pc+BP
1-(L(1-S))-
gc-pc+BP
1-(L(1-α−
S))-gc-
pc+BP
M –G –P- 1+Z 1+(Z(1-β)
)−ΒΒ
1+(Z(1-
S))
1+(Z(1-β
−S))-BB
1+Z-L 1+(Z(1-β)
)-(L(1-α))-
BB
1+(Z(1-
S))-L
1+(Z(1-β−S
))-(L(1-α))-
BB
M –G +P- 1+Z-pc 1+(Z(1-β)
)−pc-ΒΒ
1+(Z(1-
S))-pc
1+(Z(1-β
−S))-pc−
ΒΒ
1+Z-L-
pc+BP
1+(Z(1-β)
)-(L(1-α))
−pc-
BB+BP
1+(Z(1-
S))-L-
pc+BP
1+(Z(1-β−S
))-(L(1-α))−
pc-BB+BP
M –G –P+ 1+Z-gc 1+(Z(1-β)
)−gc−ΒΒ
1+(Z(1-
S))-gc
1+(Z(1-β
−S))-gc−
ΒΒ
1+Z-
(L(1-S))-
gc
1+(Z(1-β)
)-(L(1-α−S
))−gc-BB
1+(Z(1-
S))-(L(1-
S))-gc
1+(Z(1-β−S
))-(L(1-α−S
))−gc-BB
M –G +P+ 1+Z-gc-
pc
1+(Z(1-β)
)−gc-pc−
ΒΒ
1+(Z(1-
S))-gc-
pc
1+(Z(1-β
−S))-gc−
pc-ΒΒ
1+Z-
(L(1-S))-
gc-
pc+BP
1+(Z(1-β)
)-(L(1-α−S
))−gc-pc-
BB+BP
1+(Z(1-
S))-(L(1-
S))-gc-
pc+BP
1+(Z(1-β-
S))-(L(1-α-
S))-gc-pc-
BB+BP
22
N
at
ur
e 
Pr
ec
ed
in
gs
 : 
do
i:1
0.
10
38
/n
pr
e.
20
07
.7
40
.1
 : 
Po
st
ed
 1
6 
Au
g 
20
07
Fig. 1
Fig. 2
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Fig. 3 A
Fig. 3 B
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 Fig. 4
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Fig. 5 A
Fig. 5 B
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